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T h e  S at 70: 
P T i m e  for retirement. 
By Adam C. Pritchard 
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A s one grows older, birthdays gradually shift from being celebratory events to more reflective occasions. One's 
40tl1 birthday is commemorated rather differently from one's 
2 lst, which is, in turn, celebrated quite differently from one's 
first. After a certain point, the individual birthdays become less 
important and it is the milestone years to whch we pay particular 
attention. Sadly for entities like the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, it is only the milestone years (the ones ending in five 
or zero, for some reason), that draw any attention at all. No one 
held a conference to celebrate the SEC's 67th anniversary. Clearly 
the SEC is not getting its fair share of chocolate cake. 
Dame Law Review, U1?i1'er*sitl o f  Koti-e Dllrllc. Law Eventually the birthdays come to be recognitions of the fact 
, - 
that you are still around. Survival, not moving ahead in life, 
Quadrangle Note$ i c  rrsl~orlcil~le foi- irrzl p~-i-oi-s thut 1 1 1 1 r 1  
becomes the notable fact. And so it is with the SEC. It has now 
occzrr- i l l  1 - c> /~ i - i l i t i l rq  0 1 - editill? t l l i c  tlrticle. been 70 years since Congress created the SEC in the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934. We are still short of the gold standard 
for human survival -- 100 years - but 70 is not bad. The SEC 
today looks poised to outlast even the longest human life span. 
It has largely moved beyond the tasks that dominated much of 
its early agenda - the taming of the NewYork Stock Exchange, 
the reform of corporate bankruptcies and public utilities - and 
ensconced itself firmly as the arbiter of corporate disclosure and 
the primary enforcer of anti-fraud rules relating to the purchase 
and sale of securities. And the perceived importance of those 
latter-day functions, and thus, the SEC's prospects for survival, 
have only increased of late, reinforced by the jn  de sicle accounting 
scandals and corporate abuses. The list is by now familiar 
- Enron, WorldCom,Tyco, Adelphia, Global Crossing, etc., etc. 
- and that drumbeat of scandal has made the SEC once again the 
fair-haired boy of the Congress and the White House. The SEC 
was given a raft of new enforcement tools by Congress in the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act as politicians fell over themselves to get tough 
on corporate crime in the wake of the collapse of the tech bubble. 
The SEC - most anxious not to disappoint - has responded to 
this groundswell of support with a flurry of rulemalong aimed 
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at accountants, analysts and audit committees, just to covcr thc 
"A1's. I have not run across any rules directcd toward the "Z1's, but 
I am sure that is only because the agcncy has not gotten that far 
yct. So thc SEC clearly shows no interest in slowing down and 
taking it casy as it reaches its advanced years. A more telling sign 
of continued vitality at thc SEC is that thc customary complaints 
about how the agency docs not have nearly enough resources to 
adequately do its job of protecting the integrity of our financial 
markets have given way to an extraordinary situation in ~ h c h  t e
agency finds itself unable to spend all of the money allocated to 
it by Congress (which v7as in turn, more than the White House 
aqked for). This is a most unusual problem for a bureaucracy to 
have. In sum, business is booming at the SEC. 
How odd thcn, the suscstion of my title that it might be time 
for the SEC's retirement. Retirement can be made mandatory 
for persons in "high policymalung position[s]" after the age of 65, 
and the SEC certainly qualifies as a polic~maker. But no one is 
pushing the SEC toward retirement. \Veil, almost no one - I am 
not the first to suges t  that the time has come to put the SEC out 
to pasture. Jon Macey suggested 10 years ago at a coinmemora- 
tion of the bureau's 60th annivcrsary that the SEC had become 
"ob~oletc'~ and that it \\.as time to lull it off. The cfficicncy of the 
financial markets, Macey argucd, has increased "as technolop 
had de~relopcd and as market professionals who compete to find 
inispriced securitics have emerged in hugc numbcrs." Moreover, 
"the oppoi-tunitics for inanipulation and fraud are probably fewer 
now than at any time in histol-y" and "rules against fraud csistcd 
long before there was an SEC." Finally the development of 
portfolio thcory and capital asset pricing models had eliminated 
divcrsifiablc risks from the investmcnt process. Macey's conclu- 
sion: "Markct forccs and csogcnous technological changcs . . . 
have obviatcd any ~ ~ u h l i c  interest justification for thc SEC that ma! 
havc existed." 
Macey's argument was a non-starter then. Thc conventional 
~visdorn hcld that "thc SEC is onc important rcason wh\r thc 
sccuritics industrv is in so much hctter shape than othcr financial 
ser\.icc industries, and wh\r U.S. securities markets are the 
best securitics markets in thc ~\.orld." The causal connection 
bctvvccn thc cxistence of thc SEC and tllc strcngth of the U.S. 
capital markets was difficult to pinpoint, but thc convcntio~al 
wisdom did not qucstion its existence. And that convcntiondl 
\+,isdom concerning the essential role of the SEC in protecting 
the integrity of the financial markets has only been ~tren~gthened 
by the aforementioned accounting scandals although the certainty 
that the U.S. markets are the best in the \vorld may have been 
shaken a bit. 
Am I simply tilting at the same windmills as Macey! I think 
not. Whereas Macey seemed intent on affirmatively lulling off the 
SEC and its essential functions, my proposal is (I think), consider- 
ablv more modest.To return to the metaphor of my title, I think 
retirement would suffice; capital punishment of the kind proposed 
bv Macey is a bit extreme. By retirement, I mean the abolition of 
the SEC and the transfer of its essential functions to the executive 
branch. Specifically, 1 propose transferring the SEC's r ep l a -  
tory function to the Treasury Department and its enforcement 
function to the Justice Department, while leaving largely intact 
the enforcement functions of the state securities authorities and 
the self-reLplatory organizations such as the National Association 
of Securities Dealers (NASD), the NewYork Stock Eschange 
(NYSE), and the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(PCAOB). 
Old \vine in ne\\- bottlcs? Again, I think not. Separating the 
SEC's replatory function from its enforcement function proinises 
to impro\.e the effectiveness and efficiency of both. My main 
point goes to accountabilitv. Although it is traditionally argued 
that placing administrati\-e responsibilities within the esecutive 
branch rather than an independent agency is desirable because 
it increases accountability I think that the shift of authoritv I 
propose might diminish accountabilitv, at least of a ccrtain sort. 
The accountability that I believe should be diminished is the SEC's 
accountability to Congress. Because the SEC is an "independent" 
agency, the President's influence over thc agency is limited to the 
abilitv to nominate commissioners, and even that power is subject 
to the Senate's confirmation authority The SEC's status as an 
"independent" agency leaves it vulnerable to the political \vhlns 
of kcv legislators. That \vulnei-ability fuels the cvclical pattern 
of neglect and hytcrical overreaction that typifics securities 
regulation emanating from both thc SEC and Congress. Moving 
securities regulation to the eaecutivc branch might hclp insulate 
thc field from this dcstructive pattern. In addition, congressional 
oversight docs littlc to help overcome the SEC's susccptibilitv 
to groupthink and confirmation hias. Morcovcr, moving securi- 
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ties regulation to the executive branch might open up the field to 
more di\-erse perspectives. More executive branch involvement 
might also encourage securities regulators to move beyond their 
fixation with promulgating new disclosure requirements. Finally, 
disrupting the close connection between the SEC and Congress 
might disrupt - at the margin - the disproportionate influence 
that interest groups exert over securities regulation. I should 
begin with a caution: I do not mean to overstate my case. The SEC 
should certainly not be singled out as an underperformer among 
regulatory agencies. It enjoys the reputation as being one of the 
more competent of the administrative agencies and that reputa- 
tion is, in my vie\?; largely warranted. My point is a more modest 
one: Institutions matter in reLplatory policy. In the field of securi- 
ties regulation at least, the investing public is not well served 
by vesting authority in an independent agency. I do not believe 
that securities regulation in the United States has been a failure, 
but that does not mean that we are incapable of doing better. We 
might do better by placing the responsibility for the development 
of securities regulation and the enforcement of those rules in the 
executive branch. 
Where has the SEC fallen short?The list should be a familiar 
one for most observers of securities law; I do not offer it as 
original. Nor is it intended to be comprehensive; others will have 
their own favorite examples of SEC failure. My purpose here is 
merely to show that the SEC's interaction with Congress ~ l a y s  an 
important role in explaining a range of familiar shortcomings. 
The single most powerful influence on replatory policy is 
the urge to protect defrauded investors in the wake of the bull 
market. To be sure, some investors are defrauded as a bull market 
is climbing ever higher, but the rising tide tends to obscure the 
shenanigans as everyone focuses on the profits that they are piling 
up on paper. Congressmen (at least some of them) recoLpize in 
the abstract that encouraging liquid securities markets will facili- 
tate capital formation, and thus, economic growth. ReLplation 
may be necessary to secure that liquidity. That interest, however, 
is not high on the list of legislative priorities during bull markets 
when investors' primary focus is counting their gains and chasing 
the next "sure thing." During these periods, Congress is happy to 
leave the day-to-day regulating to the SEC, which is, after all, the 
expert agency. 
Bear markets, however, inevitably follow bull markets. 
Corporate mismanagement and corruption can be obscured by 
rising stock prices in a bull market, but the dirty laundry has 
a way of surfacing in bear markets.The bad news flushes out 
dissatisfied investors who clamor for government intervention. 
Politicians who happily ignored cver-climbing stock markets 
become profoundly interested in disclosure policy when the 
financial news migrates from the business page of the newspaper 
to the front page. The accounting scandal dulour provides an 
opportunity to fulminate, hold a series of show trials called 
"legislative hearings" to rake some greedy businessmen over the 
coals, and then enact legislation to protect "investor confidence." 
Indeed, that is the genesis of the Exchange Act, which garnered 
much of its legislative momentum from the legislative proceed- 
ings orchestrated by Franklin Roosevelt's henchman, Ferdinand 
Pecora. The recent spectacle of politicians falling all over them- 
selves to outdo each other in "getting tough on corporate crime" 
is only the latest chapter of political overreaction to the fallout 
of corruption revealed by a bear market. How quickly the winds 
shfted in Washington when Enron and WorldCom collapsed 
under the weight of their "creative" accounting. Congress and 
the SEC, previously inert, have responded to public outrage over 
corporate shenanigans by proposing a laundry list of new laws 
and regulations to crack do\\m on corporate abuses. For example, 
after styrmeing regulation of auditor independence during the bull 
market, Congress quickly shifted course on the question with the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act imposing an array of restrictions on services 
by accounting firms to their audtor clients. 
There may be more than political opportunism at work here. 
The availability heuristic is also in play, as both the SEC and 
Congress focus too narrowly on recent and immediately available 
information. Regulators may also be too quick to see a pattern in 
a series of events that are in fact random. For example, a handful 
of salient accounting scandals may be construed as a corporate 
qovernance crisis. In the face of a crisis, regulatory approaches 
seem to make sense when they previously had no support what- 
soever. Immediately prior to the Enron scandal, CEO certifica- 
tion of financial statements was nowhere to be found on the SEC 
list of policy initiatives. It was hardly news that CEOs sometimes 
fudge the numbers, occasionally on a grand scale. Nonetheless, 
CEO certification - like other aspects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
- would not have been adopted without the external pressure 
to react to a supposed crisis. Similarly, before the Enron scandal 
broke, Capitol Hill had no interest in safeguarding the role that 
analysts o lay as gatekeepcrs in the securities markets. After the 
scandal, legislators were baying for regulatory rcform, some of 
them - perhaps - even sincerely. It seems unlikely that this shift 
on the part of la~~makers  could represent a rational response to 
new jnformation. More likely, it is a symptom of the availability 
heuristic at work. Also at work is the hindsight bias, as SEC regu- 
lators and their congressional overlords place too much weight 
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on the probability of past events that actually occurred relative 
to those that did not. Enron was "obviously" a disaster waiting 
to happen - how odd that so few recoLgnized it before disaster 
struck. 
And of course these biases interact in perverse ways with 
the aforementioned political imperative to respond to the latest 
headlines. Opportunistic politicians may take advantage of the 
biases of the electorate, playing up recent instances of fraud 
to gain electoral support. Analyst independence only became 
a priority when the NewYork state attorney general revealed 
incriminating internal e-mails from Merrill L ~ c h .  Only after 
Enron and WorldCom moved accounting from the business 
page to the front page was auditor independence a compel- 
ling need. The SEC did nothing to discourage the notion that 
the small number of companies implicated in these scandals 
reflected a broader pattern, a statistically very dubious proposi- 
tion (following the "law" of small numbers). Notwithstanding 
this dubious empirical foundation, once this story took hold 
alternative explanations were pushed aside. Just as curious as 
the (over)-reaction to the "analyst affair" was the lack of reform 
effort prior to the scandal. The airing of the investment bank's 
dirty laundry provided no new information on the conflicts of 
interest that plague that business model. The SEC - and indeed, 
most investors -- have long known that analyst ratings are skewed 
toward optimism and that auditors often provide non-au&ting 
services to their clients. 
Worse yet, some of the abuses that Congress has lately seen 
fit to regulate can be traced back, not to a lack of regulation, but 
rather, laxity in enforcement. During the bull market, Congress 
had more important uses for the taxes generated from securi- 
ties transactions than policing the securities markets. An under- 
staffed Securities and Exchange Commission long ago gave up 
periodic review of company filings because it had other priorities. 
Accounting fraud ranked low on the enforcement agenda, trailing 
the vendetta against insider traders and the pursuit of teenagers 
engaged in Internet stock scams. Only in the late 1990s did the 
SEC make financial reporting a priority. Once financials were put 
under the microscope, the agency claimed itself to be shocked 
to find that chief financial officers were playing fast and loose 
with the numbers. Once the SEC started loohng at the books, 
the number of restatements skyrocketed and we had a "deluge of 
restatements" on our hands (at least in the light of the particularly 
salient accounting scandals making the front pages). 
The "deluge" now seems to have abated somewhat, but the 
passage of the Sarbanes-Odey Act has been followed up by an 
o r u  of rulemaking that shows no signs of subsiding anytime 
soon. The SEC, seeing a window of opportunity, looks for areas 
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in which to expand its sphere of influence while the public still 
worries over the specter of massive fraud. The regulation of hedge 
funds looks to be the next territory to conquer. 
Congress, however, sho\vs certain signs of restlessness. As the 
echoes of those accounting shenanigans begin to fade, various 
members of Congress have been making threatening noises on 
the question of the proper accounting treatment of options. The 
loss to public corporations of beefed-up internal controls is called 
into question. Scandal-driven reform followed by political neglect 
has been a recurring pattern in the securities markets. Although 
scandals may be needed to focus dispersed lawmakers' collec- 
tive will, they often result in overreaction, ~articularly if political 
entrepreneurs succeed in framing the issue in a way that resonates 
with the electorate. 
That dynamic means that demands for financial market regula- 
tion will arise in times of crisis, particularly if that crisis spills 
over into the real economy. Crisis, however, does not create the 
ideal environment for developing balanced, cost-effective policy 
interventions. Politicians will want to "do something," even if 
the proposed something may prove to be costly, ineffective, or 
counterproductive. SEC Commissioners and &vision heads will 
be called to the carpet by legislators looking to hold someone 
accountable for the market decline. Commissioners and staffers 
tend not to enjoy such encounters. Not being paid very well 
(relative to their alternative employment opportunities), they 
expect to at least lead a quiet life, which leads them to a strong 
preference for conservatism in regulation. From the bureaucrat's 
perspective, the optimal number of regulatory failures is zero. 
If a rule makes an incremental contribution to the avoidance of 
a future crisis, government regulators may be quick to see the 
rule's wisdom, discounting its costs. Those costs will be born 
bv investors generally, in the form of small reductions in their 
investment returns and disclosure documents that bury important 
information in a sea of minutia. Those costs are sufficiently diffuse 
that they are unllkely to generate a groundswell for regulatory 
reform. Thus, the cumulative effect of regulation in response to 
crisis is a ratchet effect pushing towal-d greater, more intrusive 
regulation and greater dead-weight costs for investors. 
It may take multiple crises to push government regulations 
to the point where they become a serious drag on the financial 
markets, but having reached that point, it becomes very difficult 
to turn the ship of state toward less regulation. Staffers at the SEC 
have more important tasks to worry about than figuring out which 
regulations can be discarded - when is the last time anyone at 
the SEC sat down looking for items to cut kom Replation S-K? 
Do investors in today's environment really need a discussion of 
the impact of inflation on a company's operations? 
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Worse yet, once in place, legislation and regulations often take 
on a life of their own. It took Congress over six decades to get 
around to repealing the Glass-Steagall Act, for example, enacted 
in response to the crisis of the Great Depression. Legislators may 
accept the \rrisdom of prior legislation uncritically, operating 
under a confirmation bias. Interest groups that benefit from the 
regulatory apparatus will fight hard to preserve their prerogatives. 
Deregulation requires a mammoth (and unusual) mustering of 
political will. Without anv recent information of equal salience 
-- nonscandals tend not to generate newspaper headlines - no 
impetus will develop to remove the protective legislation. 
One could argue that this regulatory approach makes sense 
-- put out fires and "don't fix what ain't broke." It may be costly 
to experiment with new regulations (or less regulation) without 
the threat of a perceived and immediate loss to investors. But 
this generalization cannot always be true. Sometimes rational- 
izing regulation, such as loosening up restrictions on forward- 
looking disclosure, may benefit both issuers and investors. The 
continued bias toward reactive reform to the securities laws 
represents a verv dubious presumption in favor of the status quo. 
That presumption can only be overcome, it seems, by a spate 
of headlines. This political cycling between ~olicies of benign 
neglect and hvsterical overreaction suggests that the SEC, far from 
serving as a shelter against the vagaries of the political winds, acts 
more like a weathervane, s~rringing wildly with the change in the 
political atmosphere. 
66@~~o~xpth in~i99  amil c ~ n f i ~ ~ m a t i o n ~  bias 
I turn now from the SEC's susceptibility to external stimuli 
to its internal thought processes. Few observers \vould sugqest 
that there is a great deal of diversity of thought at the SEC. The 
SEC is known for its strong organizational culture. Often praised 
as hard-working and dedicated, the mission of "investor protec- 
tion" is taken to heart by virtually all SEC staffers. As former SEC 
Chairman Arthur Lcvitt put it: "Investor protection is our legal 
mandate. Investor protection is our moral responsibility. Investor 
protection is my top personal priority." This ethos is no doubt 
reinforced by self-selection among thosc seeking SEC cmploy- 
ment.Thc pcople who pursue carecrs as regulators and enforce- 
ment officials may bc individuals with heightened senses of justice 
and fairness. This is not entirely a bad thing. Such traits may lead 
regulators to work hard for rclatively low pay. Such a culture 
helps maintain morale and focuses SEC staffers on the task of 
regulating the capital markets. 
Dcspite thcse benefits, the strong investor protection culture 
within the SEC may also lead to "groupthink." Groupthink occurs 
when individuals comc to identify with thc organization and 
accept its mission uncriticallv duc to their percci\~ctl member- 
ship in the group. Although an individual mav assess a particular 
decision critically, members of a group dcfcr to the consensus. 
Groupthink will also tcnd to rcducc the rangc of hypothcscs 
that an organization considers when faced with a prohlem. 
Homogeneous groups like the self-selected SEC staffers arc 
particularly susceptible to the confirmation bias and arc pcrhaps 
more likely to engage in self-serving inferences (to the extent that 
all the staffers have a homogeneous interest). Once thc SEC has 
committed to a policy initiative through a rulemalung proposal 
- thereby tentatively committing to thc "group" - feedback on 
the proposal may get less weight than it would have if thc infor- 
mation had been solicited before the SEC fixated upon a specific 
proposal. 
Groupthink mav also manifest itself in the SEC's single-minded 
focus on investor protection. When a decision can be placed on a 
normative scale, such as more or less investor protection, group 
decision dynamics will push the group toward a polar end of the 
scale. At the SEC, the systematic tendency will be to settle on 
outcomes that promise more investor protection. Many investors 
may be able to protect themselves, but the SEC usuallv focuses 
on the stereotypical "~vido\vs and orphans" in crafting protections. 
The SEC's recent initiative to regulate hedge funds, the invest- 
ment haven of the ultra-rich, springs to mind. If hedge funds 
are not safe for widows and orphans, the SEC must bring them 
to heel. Only political pressure is likely to deter the SEC from 
seeking the most restrictive alternative. 
The SEC's focus on "~rido\vs and orphans" also hclps cxplain 
its consistently siding with the plaintiffs' bar. The plaintiffs' bar, of 
course, styles itself as the "investors' ad\.ocateV even morc strongly 
than does the SEC. Private class-action litigation has been an 
important impetus toward ever more cxpansive intcrpretations 
of the anti-fraud rules. With a fcw minor exceptions (somctimes 
driven by fear of congressional retribution), thc SEC has sided 
with the plaintiffs' bar in the courts. As a somewhat cxaspcr- 
ated Justice Powell noted, the "SEC usually favors a11 X. I can't 
recall a casc in which this was not so."The SEC has promoted 
this cxpansion despite the rcadily apparent ~reakncsscs in the 
arguments for invcstor compensation. 
Congrcss is of two minds on this issuc. Legislators are opposed 
to "frivo1ous litigation," but thcy strongly favor compcnsating thcir 
constituents for corporatc fraud, even going so far as to give up 
some money that would other\vise go thc U.S. Treasury. Being 
of tvro minds is the profit maximizing strategy for members of 
Congrcss, as it allows them to extract contributions from the 
dccp pockets on both sidcs of the issue. 
The SEC's singlc-minded focus on invcstor protection may 
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also fuel its aversion to clear rules. Regulated entities and their 
la\vyers vastly prefer determinate rules, which allow them 
to structure their business dealings in predictable ways. The 
SEC, ho~vcver, likes to afford itself lee\rray, promulgating mind- 
numbingly detailed and correspondingly impenetrable rules, but 
preserving discretion to pursue those who \rrould manipulate 
those rules for some deceptive purpose. Too much clarity in the 
rules is deemed to provide a "roadmap to fraud."And, of course, 
the SEC has a very expansive notion of what constitutes fraud, 
one seldom bounded by common law understandings of the term. 
Those regulated may find the outer limits of the rules only when 
they are facing an enforcement action and the SEC is demanding 
a settlement. Congress is responsible for the broad rulemalung 
delegations that have facilitated thls aversion to clear rules and it 
has done nothlng to rein in the SEC's open-ended interpretations 
of statutes. 
Does coi~gressional oversight ameliorate this tendency toward 
the groupthink of "investor protection"? Not likely; instead, 
congressional review tends to push the SEC to skew delibera- 
tion over rule proposals to make those rules easier to justifv 
to committee chairs and their staffs. If rules are proposed to 
satisfy political demands, legislative oversight will induce greater 
justification for those rules, but it is unlikely to generate more 
thoughtful consideration on the part of reLgulators. Because the 
SEC staff will be aware of the preferences of important members 
of congressional committees, the staff will tailor reLgulatory rules 
to conform to those preferences. 
The confirmation bias can be seen in the path dependence in 
the SEC's regulations. As originally enacted in the 193 3 and 1934 
Acts, the securities laws provided separate disclosure standards 
for companies malung public offerings and those whose securi- 
ties simply trade on the secondary markets. For several decades 
thercafter, commentators recoLpized the need to unify disclo- 
sure standards. Disclosures have the same relevance to investors 
whether they are purchasing in a public offering or on the 
secondary market. The SEC did not seriously consider revamping 
the scheme until the 1 960s, ultimately adopting the present 
integrated disclosure system. Even that, honrever, falls short of a 
full-fledged scheme of companv disclosure. Congress is nowhere 
to be found on this issue. Redundant disclosure is imposing a 
small but steady drag on the economy, but there is no political hay 
to be made in reducing that drag. And it certainly does not rise to 
the level of a scandal. 
Fixt-t~i~nitn D n r i t l n  JiscILoswrle 
The SEC is not kno\vn for regulatory creativity, often 
attempting to tackle difficult problems of corporate governance 
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with measures invariably derived from some variant of disclosure. 
Bribes being paid to foreign government officials? Disclose them! 
CEOs being paid obscene sums? Disclose it! Disclosure tradition- 
ally has been justified as a means of exposing potentially prob- 
lematic activities. Justice Louis Brandeis' oft-quoted phrase that 
"sunlight . . . is the best disinfectant" provides a succinct summary 
of the philosophy behind disclosure. Once investors (and others) 
can see such activities clearly, then market participants are less 
likely to engage in opportunistic behavior in the first place. 
Managers considering a self-dealing transaction, for example, 
may choose not to do so if related-party transactions must be 
disclosed. In addition to ferreting out agency costs, disclosure 
may assist rational investors in allocating their investment dollars, 
leading to better use of capital and more accurate securities 
prices. So disclosure has much to recommend it as a policy lever 
in securities regulation. 
But disclosure is far from a panacea. Bounded search at the 
SEC may blind regulators to ~ossible alternatives to disclosure 
regulation. In the wake of the Enron and WorldCom scandals, 
the SEC proposed requiring corporate chief executive officers 
to certifi corporate financial statements annually. Congress, 
anxious to be seen "doing sometlung," followed this proposal 134th 
legislation enacting the CEO certification requirement into law. 
What &us added to the existing disclosure received by investors 
is unclear, but the in terrorem threat posed to CEOs and CFOs is 
quite clear. Huge sums are nowT being devoted to ensuring that 
this "disclosure" is accurate. If it is not, the eexecutix~-.s fear, a flurry 
of la\vsuits \rill follo\l; for whch the!. face very real exposure to 
personal liability (or, a more remote prospect, an SEC enforce- 
ment action or, still more remote, criminal prosecution). Simply 
having adequate disclosures is no longer enough; company eexecu- 
tives need to disclose about disclosure. And the informational 
value to investors of this certification has to be considered quite 
dubious. Given these difficulties with disclosure as a regulatory 
tool, the SEC's continued reliance on disclosure sugests an 
undulv narl-011- search within the SEC. 
Disclosure is the tool of choice largely because that is what 
Congress has given the SEC. The SEC's regulatory sti-atep reflects 
the broad grants of authority to the agency to mandate corporate 
disclosures under the 193 3 and 1934 Acts. Alternatives to disclo- 
sure gcnerallv would require the SEC to seek statutory authoriza- 
tion from Congress. To get that authority, however, ~vould almost 
certainly require the SEC to make an empirical showing to justify 
the need for a new regulatory tool. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
provides the SEC wit11 a handful of additional tools, but disclosure 
remains the central theme. Even though it relies on disclosure 
as the cure-all for the maladies of securities markets, the SEC 
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has done surprisingly little to investigate the impact that disclo- 
sure has on those markets. The agency instead prefers to remain 
above the grubbiness of empirical data, preferring to ground its 
policy prescriptions in "investor confidence."The SEC avoids any 
meaningful definition of investor confidence, thereby avoiding the 
possibilitv of empirical contradiction. But it also avoids making a 
persuasive case to Congress for more creative tools to use against 
corporate malfeasance. Congress is unlikely to be creative in t h s  
arena on its own, given its generally reactive approach to securi- 
ties regulation. 
Resollatory ~ A ~ ~ U T P  
Why do Congress and the SEC lay such heavy burdens on 
disclosure as the regulatory workhorse?The answer to that 
question takes us to our last shortcoming, regulatory capture. 
The SEC tirelessly promotes the myth that individual investors 
can be successful in choosing their own stocks, if only they devote 
sufficient energy to the voluminous disclosures made available to 
them as a result of the wise regulations promulgated by the SEC. 
Congress happily endorses the populist notion that every Joe or 
Jane Investor can compete with the big boys in picking stocks. 
Call it the myth of investor autonomy. Moreover, well informed 
shareholders will hold directors to account, and those directors 
will in turn keep greedy managers in check. Call this one the 
myth of investor sovereignty. The empirical evidence contradicting 
both of these notions is overwheIming. 
Why do Congress and the SEC perpetuate these myths? 
Because the financial services industry requires these myths for its 
verv existence. If investors were to switch en masse to index funds 
and other forms of passive investment, the Wall Street-indus- 
trial complex would crumble. The SEC would lose its reason for 
being. And members of Congress fortunate enough to serve on 
the Senate Banking Committee and the House Financial Services 
Committee \vould lose the steady stream of contributions that 
help them maintain their tenure in office. So the m$s of investor 
autonomy and investor sovereignty must be maintained. 
It would be a mistake to overstate the regulatory capture 
story. Industry players fare well in the battle over the content of 
securities reLplation when they are enjoying the frothy rise of a 
bull market. They are no match, however, for the populist appeal 
of protecting defrauded small investors during a bear market, 
as discussed above. Overall, thcre is little evidence to show that 
the SEC's status as an independent agency has freed it from the 
influence of industry capturc. As an agcncy with a s~ccialized 
mission, it should come as no surprisc that the subjects of that 
regulatory attention have an interest in influencing the agency. 
This \rrould come as no surprise to thc Congress that created 
the SEC - enhancing the susceptibility of the regulators to 
capture was an important goal behind the creation of the SEC. 
Enforcement of the securities law was originally entrusted to 
the FederalTrade Commission, which proved less vulnerable to 
the influence of the securities industry than the broker-dealer 
community desired. The SEC was created as part of the '34 Act a4 
a more industry specific regulator that would be more amenable 
to the financial services industry. 
Although that wish mav have frustrated in the short run, in 
the long run, the narrower focus of the SEC relative to the FTC 
has made it more vulnerable to capture. The securities industry 
has spent considerable lobbying resources to influence the 
appointment of commissioners and, of even greater ~i~pificance, 
chairmen. Moreover, the financial services industry has consider- 
able influence over the information that the SEC receives as it 
undertakes its rulemalung responsibilities. The result has been a 
system of securities regulation that largely benefits the big players 
in the securities industry. The SEC's protection of fixed commis- 
sions in the brokerage industry from the debilitating effects of 
competition for nearly half a century is by now a hackneyed 
example. And the SEC has dragged its heels in implementing the 
National Market System that Congress intended to replace the old 
cartel system.The agency continues to struggle to find a place for 
proprietary trading systems as the NYSE and NASDAQ resist this 
incursion into their comfortable sinecures. It has also been argued 
that other aspects of the SEC's regulatory agenda benefit primarily 
the brokeragc industry, including much of the detailed disclosure 
required of public companies, as well as the contours of insidcr 
trading law. 
Industry influence has been reinforced by the narrow focus 
of the relevant oversight committees in Congress, the Senate 
Banlung Committee and the House Financial Services Committee. 
As Elena Kagan explains, "When Congress acts in [the sphere 
of administration], it docs so through committees and subcom- 
mittees highly unrepresentative of the larger institution (let 
alone thc nation) and ~i~pificantly associated with particularized 
intcrests."As of the writing of t h s  article, 9 of the 5 1 members 
of the House subcommittee for securities came from NewYork, 
New Jerscy or Connecticut, and 3 out of the 15 members of thc 
Senate Subcommittee came from these same three statcs. This 
concentration of legislators from the NewYork metropolitan area 
is evidence of thc fact that "the one thing the shadow executive 
system of the congressional standing committees can guarantcc 
us is that the most affected rcgional interests will try to kidnap 
thc federal law execution processes that most affcct them."The 
remaining legislators on these subcomrnittces, coming from states 
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laclang in constituents directly interested in this sector of the 
economy, may he less acutely interested in the welfare ofwall 
Street. Nonetheless, service on one of these subcommittees is 
a cash cow for these legislators, guaranteed to produce a steady 
stream of campaign contributions. Wall Street makes huge invest- 
lncnts in influencing the contours of its regulatory environment. 
The financial services industry is not the only affected party 
that givcs special attention to thcse Icgislative oversight commit- 
tees. The accounting firms and the high-tech sector are also 
intensely interested. This influence was felt during the 1990s on 
the questions of expensing stock options and auditor indepen- 
dence; the SEC backed do\vn in both cases in the face of congres- 
sional opposition. For example, corporations poured millions 
of dollars into the campaign war chests of strategically placed 
congressmen to head off the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board's efforts to require that options grants be accounted for as 
an expense. Congress then bullied the supposedly independent 
FASB into submission; the SEC aided and abetted the effort. 
The consequences of this interested oversight is that the SEC 
regulates in the shadow of potential retaliation from Congress. 
Legislators on the relevant committees have powerful tools to 
bring the agency to heel. If the agency strays too far from the 
dominant view on those subcommittees, it risks legislative over- 
ruling and worse yet, budget cuts. The bottom line: "Independent" 
agencies such as the SEC are not independent of politics; they 
are hlghly dependent upon the industries that they are charged 
with regulating. That dependency is mediated through Congress, 
which uses its mediating role to extract financial support from the 
financial services industry, accounting firms and public companies. 
Good work if you can get it. 
T l w  rsr~rnn~tiv~ lhramtrln as s~r~nnn-itiirs regzllpltnr 
My proposal is quite simple. The SEC's rulemaking authority 
should bc turned ovcr to theTreasury Department, to be overseen 
bv the same regulators who oversee other aspects of financial 
regulation. The SEC's enforcement authority should be turned 
ovcr to thc Justicc Department and combined \vith that agency's 
existing fraud section. Civil and criminal enforcement nrould be 
consolidated within the same department. 
A few administrative details would need to be worked out. 
The adjudications currently processed by the SEC's administra- 
tive law judges (ALJs) could be turncd olrcr to ALJs located in 
Treasury, or better still, bc conducted in federal district court. 
Thc SEC's supervisory authoritv over the SROs \vould also go to 
Treasury; SROs that failed to fulfill their enforcement obligations 
could be referred to Justice. The SEC's powcr to rcvicw sanctions 
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imposed by the SROs could be handed over to the district courts. 
The states could continue to play a role in enforcing the federal 
statutes and regulations devised by Treasury. 
Note that I am not suaesting firing the SEC staff - the staff 
members could be divvied up appropriately between the two 
departments without creating undue confusion. Five commis- 
sioners, however, would be loohng for work. I address beloxrr the 
justifications for the minor blip in unemployment caused by this 
s\veeping transfer of regulatory authority. 
RpxzJainrT or~rrr.ea,rt ion 
Could transferring regulatory authority to the executive 
branch dampen the rapid swings from regulatory inertia to 
regulatory hysteria? We have nitnessed a series of largely garden- 
varietjl. frauds over the past few years. Companies were making 
up earnings. Analysts were recommending stocks that they 
thought were crap. Mutual funds were providing s\veetheart deals 
to big investors in the form of guaranteed profits through late 
trading. The response of the SEC and Congress to the revela- 
tion that "There is fraud in our financial markets!" has been a 
deluge of new statutes and regulations. Those subject to all these 
new rules publicly \velcome them and privately pass the costs 
along to investors. To be sure, some of the wrongdoers are now 
facing enforcement actions and criminal prosecution. And the 
companies, broker-dealers and mutual funds implicated in the 
sleaze have taken a serious hit in the market, which enforces its 
judLgments much more swiftly and surely than the government 
ever could. But sending the bad guys to jail and hammering the 
stock price of their employers is never enough. We must punish 
the ~ ~ r o n g d o e r s  and make sure t h ~ s  never happens again. I have 
no quarrel with punishing the wrongdoers, but I fear that the 
SEC and Congress will t~picallv be fighting the last nrar as thev 
continually expand the Code of Federal Regulations and the 
United States Code in their quest to end fraud. The fraudsters, 
I'm afraid, will ahvays be lvith us. 
Would transferring accountability from the SEC to the 
executive branch help matters? Accountability (or the lack 
thereon favors the status quo in this context. Although the 
President remains ultimately accountable for policv choices 
affecting the securities markets in my model, the transfer of 
authority envisioned in my proposal \rould divide accountability 
between the Departments of Treasur? and Justice. Unlike the 
cominissioners of the SEC, who are responsible for both rule- 
making and enforcement, the Secretary of the Treasury and the 
Attorney General lmuld cnch exercise o n l ~  a portion of the 
regulatory authoritv currently wielded bv the SEC. Unlike the 
ultimate accountabilit!. hornc by the President, these political 
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actors n-ould be accountable only for the regulatory authority 
within their respective jurisdwtions. This means that each will be 
pointing the finger at the other in the event of regulatory "failure." 
Was the scandal of the week the result of insufficiently stringent 
rules or a consequence of lax enforcement? 
One does not ordinarily consider finger-pointing of this sort 
a useful mechanism for encouraging effective regulation. In this 
context, holvever, separating enforcement and rulemaking allows 
for a healthy bit of indirection and delay. The SEC has no one else 
to blame when it is draged before Congress - Congress has 
certainly not been grudging in affording it rulemaking authority, 
even if it frequently has been rather tight-fisted with dollars for 
enforcement. But Justice andTreasury could blame each other. 
"The rules prohibiting this fraud are unclear, so \re can't go 
after the bad guys" can be met by "This behavior clearly violates 
our anti-fraud rules. Prosecutors should come down hard on 
these fraudsters."This is the sort of mutual recrimination that 
Washmgton uses a11 the time to deflect calls for change. It is 
sometimes disparagingly characterized as "gridlock," but it has an 
important stabilizing influence, unless one dunks that every social 
ill calls out for a vigorous government response. The President 
would be accountable for the trade-off between rulemaking and 
enforcement. Congress is likely to thnk twice before it calls him 
before a subcommittee for a lecturing on regulator? priorities and 
the critical need to protect widows and orphans. Simply put, the 
President is too busy for that. By contrast, commissioners of the 
SEC, most assuredly, are not. 
If Congress wanted to make its influence felt, it would have 
to go through the tedious and time-consuming process of 
drafting legislation, finding a majority coalition to vote for it, and 
the President to sign the resulting bill into law. The 
marginal cost of this effort is substantially greater than bullying 
the SEC. Perhaps Congress, too, would then find better thmgs to 
do. 
Task diversit? and d i~7ers i t~  
The Secretary of theTreasury has a lot of irons in the fire. 
According to the department's Website, "The mission of the 
Department of the Treasury is to promote the conditions for 
prosperity and stabilit). in the United States and encourage pros- 
perity and stability in the rest of the world."That's a big job. More 
concretely, the Treasury is responsible for: 
Managing federal finances; 
Collecting taxes, duties and monies paid to and due to the 
United States and paying all bills of the United States; 
Producing postage stamps, currency and coinage; 
Managing government accounts and the public debt; 
Supervising national banks and thrift institutions; 
Advising on domestic and international financial, monetary, 
economic, trade, and tax policy; 
Enforcing federal finance and tax laws; 
Investigating and prosecuting tax evaders, counterfeiters, 
and forgers. 
This diversity of tasks encourages a diversity of perspcc- 
tives among the top officials at theTreasury. Although all of the 
senior staff are likely to have expertise in one or more of these 
areas, it is unlikely that any one of these areas will predominate. 
Consequently, when it comes time to decide important policy 
matters, the Secretary will be getting advice from people with 
a broad range of backgrounds. For the Secretary and the rest 
of theTreasury staff, it is hard to have a single-minded focus on 
saving widows and orphans from the vipers ofwall Street when 
you have so many tasks that require your attention. Investor 
protection \vould continue to be an important goal for aTreasury 
Department charged with regulating the securities markets, 
but so would capital formation, diversification of the outlets for 
financial services to consumers, and cooperation with foreign 
regulators. 
To be sure, under my proposal, many members of the Trcasury 
staff will specialize in the regulation of the securities markets, but 
their proposals will face the scrutiny of superiors not suffused 
in the culture of investor protection. And promotion within the 
department is unlikely to be a lock-step progression - a person 
who shows talent in the field of banking or tax might bc tappcd 
for an important role in regulating the securitics markets. Going 
higher up the chain, Republicans and Democrats would switch 
places in the politically-appointed slots as power shiftcd in the 
White House. The result would be less homogeneity, broader 
search and more critical thinlung generally. 
So too, with the Justicc Department. The Attorney Gencral 
has at least as broad a range of concerns as thc Secretary of the 
Treasury - locking up terrorists, fighting the war on drugs, 
prosecuting environmental polluters, etc. Going down to the 
trenches, thc FBI special agent who shows talent in making a case 
against Medicare fraudsters may wcll have talent for unraveling 
the machinations of accounting fraudsters. Fraud is fraud, and 
the expertise of the SEC staff can easily be oversold. The Justice 
Department has many lawyers and investigators who are profi- 
cient at prosecuting securities fraud (e.g., the fraud unit of the 
U. S. Attorney's office in the Southern District of Ncw York) . 
There would be many more such professionals if the Justice 
Department took over civil enforcemcnt of the securities laws 
along with the criminal authority that it already exercises. But 
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cxpcrtisc must bc balanccd against diversity of perspective, ant1 it 
is hard to imagine any state of thc \vorld in which the SEC would 
surpass Justice on diversity. 
Morc importantly, the lawyers at Justice are more likely to 
view thc rcgulations promulgated by Trcasury with a critical 
eye. Although both dcpartmcnts are nominally components of 
thc executive branch, they have distinct histories and cultures. 
Lawyers at Justice are much less likely to buy in to the work of 
Treasury than SEC enforcement attorneys are to buy in to the 
work of the Divisions of Market Regulation or Corporate Finance. 
The lawyers in the executive branch arc on the same side, but 
not the same team. Justice is unlikely to suffer from confirmation 
bias in reviewing the proposals ofTreasury; it is not their work, 
after all. The division between the two departments also matters 
for those discussions of enforcement policy in slightly shabby 
conference rooms at Justice or  theTreasury. Clear rules may be 
a "roadmap to fraud," but it is much easier to sho~v iolations of 
them in court. The skepticism with which the Solicitor General's 
office has treated some of the SEC's more cockamamie theories 
affords a concrete example. 
Lawyers at the Justice Department are also more likely to 
be skeptical of the need for class action litigation and investor 
compensation. The SEC's support for the plaintiffs' bar helps 
the agency with the more populist element in Congress, but the 
Justice Department kno\vs that deterrence is really the critical 
element in minimizing the social costs of fraud. Fraudsters need 
to go to jail and pay hefty fines; what happens to the money 
afterward is, at best, a sidesho~v. 
Fixationn WiltL dli5flo~~~r~ 
Can a transfer of authority to the esecutive branch stimulate 
more creative thinking about regulatory responses to malfeasance 
by corporate officers and financial serviccs profcssionals! Rccall 
my argument that the Congress and the SEC focus almost exclu- 
sivelv on disclosure because it reinforces the myths of investor 
autonomy and sovereiLpty, a very lucrative mvth as far as the 
financial serviccs sector is concerned. 
Would the Treasury and the President be equally enamored 
of this myth of the cmpo~vcrcd investor?To be sure, the financial 
serviccs industry is a major contri1,utor to presidential as \yell as 
congressional campaigns, so disclosure has continued appeal. But 
the lines of accountability for ultimate policy choices would be 
clarified somcnrhat wit11 a transfer of authority to the executive 
branch. A risk-averse President who wanted to a\.oid a political 
backlash from the next bull market would strongly favor a well- 
diversified electorate. The real storics of pain in a inarkct decline 
arc from thc poor souls ~ v h o  arc undcr-diversified. Politicians, of 
THE SEC AT 70: TIME FOR RETIREMENT? 
course, are notoriously wary of blaming even foolhardy victims 
for thcir plight (think of the Enron employees), despite the inex- 
pensive self-help that they could haw adopted. "This all could have 
been avoided with a bit more disclosure!" O r  a bit of diversifica- 
tion. It is doubtful that a politician in the White House would 
be willing to blame the victim any more than Congress and the 
SEC. Policy will continue to focus on throwing the books at the 
wrongdoers. 
But will the President follo\lr~ condemnation of the bad guys 
with a slew of new disclosure requirements to address last year's 
fraud?The President has the advantage of being able to rely on the 
strong rhetorical message sent by actual criminal prosecutions. 
The SEC's civil enforcement po\trers look rather tame by compar- 
ison to hard time. Congress has only the ability to write additional 
rules. Congress can, of course, ratchet the jail time up another 
couple notches, but most maximum penalties in the securities 
area are already \\?ell past the point of diminishing marginal deter- 
rence and, \verse yet, obviouslv so. No one is impressed anymore 
bv another five to ten potential years of jail time for white-collar 
criminals after the first ten to twent)l. Martha Stewart's six 
months in prison will be quite sufficient to deter her from lying 
to the government in the future. Neither Congress nor the SEC 
has the satisfving po\trer of throwing the fraudsters in jail. Used 
agppessivel\; the authority to prosecute could satiate the public 
clamor to do something without imposing an additional burden of 
disclosure costs on all the business that did not break the law and 
should not be ~unished.  T h s  may not satisfi the hue and for 
government intervention in extreme cases, but a few 11-ell-placed 
"perp walks" can help deflect the demand for additional disclosure 
requirements. 
R p R ~ x l a t  orv  rnptnlrp 
Would a transfer of authority to the executive branch make a 
significant dent in the extent of regulator\. capture? Of the four 
concerns identified here, this onc carries the least weight; it would 
he insufficient standing alone to justifv transferring replatorv 
authority to the executive branch. The principal effect of such a 
transfer on the usual pattcrn of "Inside-the-Beltlvav" rcnt seeking 
would be to simply shift some of the power to extract rents 
- regulated industries from members of Congress lvould have 
a bit less, and the Prcsidcilt \\.auld have a bit more.The financial 
ser~~ices  industr!, already tries to curry favor with the President 
in ordcr to influence the choicc of con~n~issioners and to be ablc 
to call upon thc President's aid in the lawmahng process (rither 
to instigate, or vcto, legislation). Giving the Prcsident a u t h o r i ~  
over rulemaking would enhance thc President's attractil-encss as 
recipient of lobbying largesse. By contrast, lobb\ing to influence 
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the Justice Department's enforcement agenda would be very 
tricky business; not many White House staffers would enjoy 
waking up to read in the il'ashington Port about influence peddling 
related to Justice Department fi-aud prosecutions. On balance, 
I think the overall shft  would be to make members of Congress 
less attractive and the President more attractive, but rent seelung, 
like fraud, will always be with US. 
Despite these caveats, I think that my proposal would achieve 
some limited success in difhsing the effect of lobbying expen- 
dtures. Members of the House and Senate subcommittees for 
securities that do not have a substantial number of constituents in 
the financial services industry have little to constrain them from 
offering their votes and influence to the highest interested bidder. 
The voters back home in Wyoming will have little interest in 
their representative's vote on reforming the market structure for 
buying and selling securities. In that vacuum of electoral interest, 
campaiLp contributions (which can be used to pay for the televi- 
sion ads to reach all those voters spread so thinly across the state) 
can be very persuasive indeed. 
The President, by contrast, has many constituencies to whch 
he must answer and is unlikely to be able to give decisive weight 
to any one interest group. Simply put, it costs more to buy a 
President than a legislator, even a well-placed one. Moreover, 
it is harder for lobbyists to gain access to the President, given 
the demands on his time. To be sure, the White House staff and 
Treasun Department officials are likely to be more responsive, 
but they too will have diverse constituencies to which they need 
to attend on the President's behalf. Congressional committee 
members will still have a role to play in influencing policy, but 
they carry substantially less of a threat in a conflict with the 
executive branch than they do with the SEC. The President, as a 
roughly co-equal actor in the legislative and budgetary processes, 
can fight back if a department's budget is threatened; the SEC has 
to grin and take it. A transfer to the executive branch will not 
eliminate concerns over re$atory capture, but it might slow 
do\\m by a step or two the interest groups attempting to capture 
regulatory policy. 
More importantly, the accountability for tailoring regulation 
to suit interest groups would be clear. Under the current regime, 
Congress can bully the SEC into caving in when faced with 
interest group pressure and no member of Congress will face any 
serious threat of reprisal (as with Congress' derailing of expensing 
for options). There is safety in numbers. If the President overrules 
rules proposed by the Treasury staff, the responsibility will be 
clear. If new rules are warranted, the President who nixes them 
would face a considerably more substantial risk of political embar- 
rassment than would an individual congressman. 
(cBnc1TULS;OIl 
As the SEC marks its 70th anniversary, the survival of securi- 
ties regulation, and the federal government's role in that regula- 
tion, are no longer in doubt (if they ever were). Federal securities 
regulation is here to stay; proposals to do away with it are unlikely 
to garner much support anytime soon. 
I have made a more modest proposal: transferring that 
authority over securities regulation to the executive branch. The 
main impetus behind my call for reform is that the SEC is "inde- 
pendent" in name only. The agency's dependence on Congress has 
some unfortunate consequences for the path of regulatory policy 
in the field of securities. Specifically, far from dampening the 
boom and bust cycle in securities regulation, the SEC - under 
the watchful eye of Congress - has fueled the cyclical swings in 
regulatory policy as a means of gaining additional authority and 
budgetary support. Congress and the SEC have fed off each insti- 
tution's cognitive biases. Most destructively for investor welfare, 
both institutions have perpetuated the twin myths of investor 
autonomy and investor sovereignty. Finall!, vesting regulatory 
authority in the SEC has facilitated agency capture and enhanced 
the ability of members of Congress to extract rents from the 
securities industry, the accounting profession, and others affected 
by securities regulation. 
I have argued that the executive branch might be somewhat 
less subject to these maladies if we were to vest authority over 
securities regulation in theTreasury and Justice Departments. I 
am far from claiming that regulatory "perfection" (whatever that 
would mean) would follow if my proposal were implemented. 
More modest improvements, however, might come about. 
Transferring authority might dampen the regulatory over-reaction 
that follows in the wake of bear markets. The Treasury and Justice 
Departments would almost certainly bring greater diversity of 
perspective to addressing the problems of corporate governance 
and the securities markets. Those departments might view more 
skeptically the claim that disclosure solves everything. And my 
proposal might reduce the extent of agency capture at the margin 
(but only at the margin). 
Is my proposal to transfer regulatory authority over the sccuri- 
ties markets to the executive branch as far-fetched as Jonathan 
Macey's call to end federal securities regulation altogether? It 
might appear so at first blush.The SEC is busier than ever, bettcr 
funded than ever, and has more support generally in Congress 
than it has enjoyed any time in recent memory. Moreover, there 
are powerful constituencies that have come to rely on the SEC 
for thcir professional livelihood. Corporate lawyers, for example, 
would strenuously resist thc abolition of the SEC. I am a natural- 
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born pessimist, so I freely concede that my proposal is unlikely to 
be adopted anytime soon. 
The one constant in securities regulation is that the political 
fortunes of the SEC generally ebb and flow with the cycles of 
the market. The correlation is inverse, however, so the SEC rides 
high when the Dow Jones Industrial Average rides low. But within 
that broader correlation there is some variance in the support for 
the SEC. When the market is first hitting the downward trend 
in its cycle, support for the SEC may dip along with the major 
indices. In one of those future dips - who can predict when it 
will come - may arise the opportunity for the sort of adminis- 
trative reform proposed here. To be sure, the relevant committees 
in Congress will cling tenaciously to their "independent" agency, 
but sometimes the political imperative to "do somethng" can 
overcome even entrenched institutional self-interest. It would be 
a poor bet to try to handicap a retirement date for the SEC, but it 
might be almost as speculative to count on the agency's staving on 
the job forever. 
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